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Recent Developments 
State v. Bell: 
A Defendant's Knowing and Voluntary Waiver of a Jury Trial Does Not Require 
Specific In-Court Advice to Defendant with Respect to the Unanimity 
Requirement 
T he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a 
defendant may knowingly and 
voluntarily waive the right to a jury 
trial without specific reference to the 
unanimity requirement during in-court 
advice given to a defendant regarding 
whether to elect a court or jury trial. 
State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 
311 (1998). The court's ruling 
clarified the knowing and voluntary 
standard that a trial court must apply 
when accepting a defendant's waiver 
ofajurytrial under revised Maryland 
Rule 4-246(b). 
Wilbur Bell ("Bell") appeared 
before Judge Michele D. Hotten 
("Judge Hotten") in the Circuit Court 
for Prince George's County on 
charges of second degree rape, 
assault and battery, attempted rape, 
and assault with intent to rape. Id. at 
711, 720A.2dat312. At the start of 
trial, Bell informed the court of his 
intentto waive ajury trial. Id. at 712, 
720 A.2d at 313. Bell was 
questioned by both his attorney and 
Judge Hotten about his decision and 
Bell was advised that the State must 
prove the charges beyond a 
reasonable doubt, before either a 
twelve-personjury, or a member of 
the bench. Id. at 714, 720 A.2d at 
313. Bell acknowledged that his 
decision to waive a jury trial was made 
freely and voluntarily. Id. The court 
accepted Bell's waiver and Bell was 
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subsequently convicted on all counts. 
!d. at 712-13, 720 A.2d at 312. 
The Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland reversed the decision, 
holding that the circuit court had failed 
to sufficiently advise Bell of his right 
to a jury trial because Bell was not 
instructed on the unanimity 
requirement setting forth that all twelve 
jurors must agree to render a guilty 
verdict. Id. at 712, 720 A.2d at 312. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
granted certiorari on the State's 
petition to consider whether Maryland 
Rule 4-246(b) requires an 
examination of the defendant regarding 
jury unanimity. Id. at 713, 720 A.2d 
at 313. 
The court of appeals addressed 
the requirement that a defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily waive the 
right to a jury trial by reviewing an 
earlier decision where the court 
considered the requirement that a 
defendant have "full knowledge" of the 
right to a jury trial as specified by 
former Maryland Rule 735( d). Id. at 
714,720 A.2d at 314. In Countess 
v. State, 286 Md. 444, 408 A.2d 
1302 (1979), the court held that the 
term full knowledge, includes, among 
other factors, the defendant's 
understanding "that in a jury trial all 
12 jurors must agree that he is so guilty 
but in a court trial the judge may so 
find." Id. at 715, 720 A.2d at 314 
(quoting Countess, 286 Md. at 455, 
408 A.2d at 1307-08). 
The court emphasized that its 
decision in Countess was made 
before the January 1, 1982, 
modification of Rule 735 which 
deleted the full knowledge 
requirement. Id. at 716, 720 A.2d 
at 314. The court noted that in the 
current form of Maryland Rule 4-
246, the full knowledge requirement 
has been replaced so that "a trial court 
may now accept a waiver if it is 
satisfied that the waiver is made 
'knowingly and voluntarily. '" Id. at 
716-17, 720 A.2d at 315. 
The court then examined the 
knowing and voluntary standard in 
absence of the full knowledge 
requirement. Id. at 717, 720 A.2d 
at 315. Specifically, the court 
addressed whether explicit reference 
to the unanimity requirement during 
in-court advice is necessary for the 
defendant to knowingly waive the 
right to a jury trial. Id. The court 
analyzed the modification to former 
Rule 73 5( d) in acco,rdance with the 
canons of statutory construction, 
which required the court to "ascertain 
and effe!mate the intention of the 
legislature." Id. (quoting Oaks v. 
Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 
A.2d 423, 429 (1995)). In so doing, 
the court first looked to the actual 
language of the statute, and then to 
the purpose of the legislation to 
determine "what different standard, 
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if any, was created when the rule was 
modified." Id. 
In analyzing the plain meaning of 
former Rule 735(d), the court 
reviewed the definition of the words 
"full" and "knowingly." Id. at 719-
20, 720 A.2d at 316. Determining 
that full means complete and entire, 
and knowingly means conscious or 
intelligent, the court concluded that 
full knowledge under Countess, 
compelled the court to completely 
explain all aspects of a defendant's 
rightto a jury trial, including, the jury's 
function at trial and the defendant's 
right to be tried by a jury. Id. at 720, 
720 A.2d at 316. (quoting THE 
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGUSH LANGUAGE 573, 672 (unabr. 
ed. 1983); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
672,872 (6th ed. 1990». The court 
further noted that in contrast to the full 
knowledge requirement, a knowing 
and voluntary waiver under current 
Rule 4-246 requires a defendant to 
do the following: (1) recognize that the 
defendant is surrendering the right to 
a jury trial, (2) possess a general 
understanding of the nature of a jury 
trial; and (3) voluntarily waive that 
right. ld. 
The court next explored the 
legislative intent and found that at the 
time of Countess, the Rules 
Committee proposed an entire redraft 
of Rule 735. Id. at 723, 720 Md. At 
318 . Specifically, the Rules 
Committee recommended that acoUIt 
could not accept a defendant's waiver 
of the jury trial right until the court was 
satisfied that the defendant 
understood: (1) the right to be tried 
by ajury of twelve persons or by a 
judge without a jury, and (2) that a 
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finding of guilt in a jury trial required 
that all twelve jurors agreed to the 
defendant's guilt. Id. (citing Seventy-
Fifth Report of the Standing 
Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, 2-3 & app. (Oct. 26, 
1981». The court noted that both 
proposals were rejected, with the 
motion to remove the unanimity 
language passing by a vote of5-2. Id. 
at 724, 720 A.2d at 318 (citing Rules 
Order, 8 Md. Reg. 1928-30 (1981); 
Minutes of Meeting of Court of 
Appeals, 3 (Nov. 6, 1981». The 
court emphasized that the rejection of 
the Committee's proposals "implies 
that we wished to move away from 
the rigidity of the former rule 735 and 
Countess." Id. The court concluded, 
therefore, that under Rule 4-246, the 
judge must be certain only that the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
waived the right to a jury trial. Id. 
In determining whether a waiver 
of the jury trial right is knowing and 
voluntary, the court adopted a facts 
and circumstances analysis as applied 
in two earlier court of appeals 
opinions. Id at 724-25, 700 A.2d 
at 319. In Hall v. State, 321 Md. 
178, 183, 582 A.2d 507,510 (1990), 
the court upheld a conviction finding 
that the defendant possessed the 
essential knowledge of the right to a 
jury trial even though the trial court 
had failed to provide the defendant 
with details about this right, including 
the jury selection process. Id. In 
Tibbs v. State, 323 Md. 28, 31-32, 
590 A.2d 550, 551 (1991), the trial 
court questioned the defendant to 
decide ifhe understood what ajury 
trial was and determined that he 
waived the right freely and voluntarily. 
Id. at 725-26, 720 A.2d at 319. The 
defendant's affirmative response, the 
court concluded, did not amount to 
the required comprehension of the jury 
trial right required by the rule. Id 
Applying a facts and 
circumstances analysis to the instant 
case, the court reasoned that although 
the trial court did not advise Bell of 
the unanimity requirement, Bell was 
instructed on the fundamentals of a 
jury trial. Id. at 726-27, 720 A.2d 
320. In particular, the court found that 
the trial court cautioned Bell that a jury 
consists of twelve people, and that a 
jury or judge would have to find Bell 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
at 727, 720 A.2d at 320. The court, 
therefore, held that under the 
circumstances, Bell's discussion with 
defense counsel and the trial court 
provided Bell with adequate 
information about his right to ajury 
trial such that he possessed the 
requisite knowledge to knowingly 
waive his right to a jury trial. Id. at 
730, 720 A.2d at 321. The court did, 
however, recognize that this issue 
should be revisited, and referred the 
question of whether a defendant 
should be expressly advised of the 
unanimity requirement to the Rules 
Committee for consideration and 
recommendation. Id. 
In Bell v. State, the court held 
that advice given to a defendant with 
respect to the unanimity requirement 
is no longer necessary for a trial court 
to accept a defendant's waiver of the 
right to a jury trial. When deciding to 
waive the constitutional right to a jury 
trial, it is paramount that a defendant 
understands t.1}e purpose and function 
of the jury. Such understanding 
encompasses the fact that a jury of 
twelve peers must unanimously 
decide the defendant's fate. Without 
this pivotal piece of infonnation a 
defendant may opt for a bench trial 
based on a mistaken belief that it takes 
only one person on the jury to find 
the defendant guilty, and, therefore, the 
probability ofbeing found guilty is the 
same if either a judge or a jury hears 
the evidence. This decision by the 
court of appeals provides room for 
this mistaken belief By providing an 
explanation of the unanimity 
requirement, the court ensures that a 
defendant does not unintentionally 
relinquish the constitutional right to a 
jmy trial. 
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